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1 Introduction
In the absence of a harmonized global climate policy, the success of humankind to avoid
dangerous levels of climate change relies on decentralized policy-setting. There is strong
evidence that current policy initiatives in the form of nationally determined contributions
pursuant to the Paris Agreement fall short of leading to pathways that limit global warm-
ing to ‘well below 2◦C’ (cf. IPCC, 2018). Even countries with high public support for
ambitious climate policy weigh the benefits of unilateral efforts to reduce their emissions
against the domestic costs and strategic industrial policy motives in a globalized world.
The problem may even be more severe than suggested by the well-known free-rider incen-
tive, according to which individual countries neglect the positive environmental externali-
ties of their own abatement efforts upon other countries, while enjoying the benefits of the
others’ efforts. Ambitious unilateral climate policy may also lead to deindustrialization
and the relocation of domestic firms to regions with lower environmental standards.
In this paper, we shed new light on the strategic effects of the (non-cooperative)
decentralized choice of emissions taxes, with a particular focus on the role of international
mobility of polluting firms. We first demonstrate that decentralized policy-setting does not
necessarily lead to an inefficient outcome. Both in the absence of environmental damage
as well as under local pollution, the outcome under strategic policy-setting coincides
with the (cooperative) first-best policy. Remarkably, this result holds even if firms are
mobile. Under transboundary pollution, by contrast, tax rates are chosen inefficiently low
under decentralization, and firm mobility aggravates this inefficiency. We also show that
the non-cooperative tax rates are lower than in the autarky benchmark where all trade is
prohibited, and policy-makers only neglect the environmental externalities due to the free-
riding incentive. Our results thus show that with transboundary pollution, decentralized
policy-making can lead to a worse outcome than suggested by the ‘standard’ free-rider
argument, with the inefficiency being particularly pronounced when firms are mobile.
These results are brought forth in a two-country model where the governments of
the countries play a non-cooperative Nash game in emissions tax rates on a general equi-
librium of input and output markets. Each country hosts two sectors using labor as
sole input in order to produce a numeraire good and a polluting good. While produc-
ers of the numeraire good act under perfect competition, the polluting good is produced
by imperfectly competitive firms which are either mobile or immobile. In each country,
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the representative household uses profit, labor, and transfer income in order to finance
consumption of the two goods. Its utility equals consumption utility less environmen-
tal damage. The government of each country imposes an emissions tax on the polluting
sector. There are several important features of this framework which allow to derive the
above-mentioned results and in combination render the model novel in comparison to the
previous literature. First, we simultaneously allow for intensive (output) and extensive
(location) margins of polluting firms. Second, due to the general equilibrium feature
the wage rate is endogenous in each country. This is the reason why in the case of firm
mobility we obtain an interior location equilibrium. Third, we consider an integrated mar-
ket approach where all goods produced in the two countries are also consumed in these
countries, avoiding the need for the assumption of a third country outside the model.
Within this framework, we first characterize the comparative static effects of emissions
taxes on the market equilibrium. It turns out that an increase in one country’s tax rate
reduces emissions in this country and increases emissions in the other country (leakage)
via corresponding changes in output. Leakage is incomplete, so total emissions from both
countries fall. Under firm mobility the effects on emissions in both countries are larger in
absolute terms, since leakage additionally takes place by relocation of firms. But the effect
on total emissions is the same as in case with given firm location. Based on these insights,
we show that the efficient (cooperative) policy equates the marginal consumption utility
of the polluting good to the opportunity costs of a reduced consumption and utility of
the numeraire good and the marginal environmental damage. By comparing this efficient
solution with the countries’ non-cooperative tax rate choice we prove our main results
that non-cooperation is efficient if environmental pollution is absent or local and that
with transboundary pollution the non-cooperative tax rates are inefficiently low, with a
higher degree of inefficiency if firms are mobile instead of immobile.
In order to provide an intuition of these results, we consider the policy externality,
i.e. the effect of one country’s tax rate on welfare in the other country. This externality
can be decomposed into two subexternalities. First, tax rate changes in one country
change production patterns and thereby consumption possibilities in the other country,
amounting to a consumption externality. Second, a change in one country’s emissions tax
rate affects pollution in the other country via emissions spill-overs and leakage, leading
to a pollution externality. In the absence of pollution, the non-cooperative tax rates are
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efficient since the pollution externality vanishes and the consumption externality also
becomes zero as it mirrors the Nash equilibrium condition. Under local pollution, the
pollution externality is strictly negative since emissions spill-overs are not present and
leakage causes an emissions increase in the foreign country. Moreover, the consumption
externality turns out to be positive and equal to the pollution externality in absolute
terms. Surprisingly, we thus obtain efficiency not because the non-cooperative tax rates
do not cause cross-country effects, but since the two subexternalities exactly offset each
other. While we show that under firm mobility the two subexternalities are both larger
in absolute terms, the opposing effects still balance out and ensure efficiency. Finally,
under transboundary pollution the sum of both externalities depends on the difference
between the leakage effect and the own emissions effect of one country’s tax rate. Since
leakage is incomplete this difference is positive, implying inefficiently low tax rates under
non-cooperation. As mentioned above, under firm mobility the gap between leakage and
the effect on own emissions increases, explaining why firm mobility raises the policy
externality and thereby aggravates the inefficiency of non-cooperative tax rates.
For further illustration, we discuss several features of our model. First, we consider
the case of autarky, without trade between the two countries. Only emissions spill-overs
prevail in this case, causing the free-rider incentive which renders the tax rates under au-
tarky inefficiently low. But we show that the inefficiency is less pronounced under autarky
than under non-cooperation with given firm location. Hence, our analysis reveals three
sources of inefficiency: free-riding (efficiency versus autarky), strategic incentives (autarky
versus non-cooperation with fixed location), and firm mobility (non-cooperation with fixed
location versus non-cooperation with endogenous location). Second, we show that the en-
dogeneity of wages tends to cushion the adverse welfare effects of non-cooperative policy
making. The reason is that with endogenous wages the firms’ output and emissions re-
action to a tax rate increase is less elastic since the wage rate falls. Finally, imperfect
competition turns out to be key to the result that firm mobility aggravates the policy inef-
ficiency, since with perfect competition, after-tax profits are always zero in both countries,
so none of the governments can attract firms by lowering tax rates.
Our paper contributes to various strands of literature. Most notably, we combine the
literature on strategic environmental policy and the literature on environmental policy
with firm location in order to show how firm mobility amplifies the welfare losses when
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countries act strategically and do not cooperate in their policy choices. More specific, the
literature on strategic environmental policy was pioneered by Conrad (1993), Kennedy
(1994), Hung (1994), and Barrett (1994). Surveys can be found in, e.g., Sturm (2003)
and Requate (2006). One basic insight of this literature is that governments may set their
emissions tax rates inefficiently low in order to capture foreign rents and increase the do-
mestic firms’ market share. We complement this result by distinguishing between intensive
and extensive margins of polluting firms and showing that firm mobility exacerbates the
inefficiency. Interestingly, there are also papers that similar to us derive efficiency of
decentralized policy if pollution is local. This is true, for instance, in Kennedy (1994)
for perfect competition, in Duval and Hamilton (2002) for balanced trade, in Hamilton
and Requate (2004) for a model where firms dispose of vertical contracts with a two-part
tariff, and in Oates and Schwab (1988) for a capital tax competition framework.1 But
again, these articles ignore the extensive margin of polluting firms, so our contribution is
to show that firm mobility does not change the efficiency outcome under local pollution.
Moreover, none of the aforementioned articles uses a general equilibrium structure and,
thus, cannot show that the endogeneity of wage rates tends to cushion the inefficiency of
decentralized emissions tax policy, which is a further contribution of our paper.
The literature on environmental policy in the presence of mobile firms was initiated
by the seminal paper of Markusen et al. (1993), who analyze location of two polluting
firms in a two-country model. In Markusen et al. (1995), the authors even endogenize
both countries’ tax rates, but restrict their attention to a monopolistic industry structure.
While relevant for our analysis, there is a fundamental difference of this literature to
our approach. Most of the existing models assume transportation costs to explain why
firms have an incentive to choose locations close to markets they serve. It is a common
finding that in the absence of transportation costs, relocation leads to the concentration
of firms in one country (cf. Hoel, 1997; Rauscher, 1995). We rarely observe such location
patterns, even though transportation costs have substantially declined in many markets
due to globalization. Moreover, the assumption of transportation costs leads to increased
complexity that confines previous studies to numerical analyses (cf. Markusen et al.,
1Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) confirm the efficiency result of Oates and Schwab (1988) even for trans-
boundary pollution. But Eichner and Runkel (2012) prove that efficiency in this case is contingent on the
capital supply elasticity to be zero, which corresponds to fixed total emissions. Eichner and Runkel (2014)
show inefficiency in a similar model with the additional policy instrument of subsidies on renewables.
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1993). In our model, by contrast, an interior location equilibrium is ensured by the
general equilibrium property of an endogenous wage rate, which has several advantages
over the assumption of transportation costs. For instance, it ensures tractability under
general functional forms of the model primitives, and it allows to investigate the impact
of endogenous wage rates on the inefficiency of decentralized environmental policy.
We finally have to mention the link of our paper to the literature on strategic trade
policy initiated by, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1985), and surveyed by Brander (1995).
In fact, our special case without pollution is a model on strategic trade policy. It is a
common finding in the trade literature that, due to rent-seeking motives, non-cooperative
policy usually does not coincide with the cooperative policy (Brander, 1995). Hence,
our efficiency result in the absence of pollution comes as a surprise. But this difference
in results can be explained by the difference in modeling consumption markets. While
comparable papers in the trade policy literature, like Brander and Spencer (1985), derive
the inefficiency result under the ‘third-country’ assumption where all firms sell their output
in a third country not explicitly modeled, we consider an ‘integrated market’ approach
where all goods produced in the two countries are also consumed in these countries.
We explicitly show in our discussion section, that our efficiency result in the absence of
environmental pollution breaks down if we introduce the third country assumption.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our basic
model. Section 3 presents the cooperative and non-cooperative policy solutions. In Sec-
tion 4, we show additional results by relaxing key assumptions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Basic Structure. We consider a model with two countries, A and B. Both countries
host production sectors for good X and good Y which use labor as sole input. Labor
is mobile across sectors and immobile across countries. Moreover, firms in the X-sector
are immobile, whereas we distinguish the cases with mobile and immobile firms in sector
2Technically, our paper is also related to the paper of Haufler and Wooton (2010) who take into account
endogenous firm location in analyzing the impact of economic integration on decentralized subsidy choice
by governments. But they, too, consider transportation costs instead of endogenous wage rates as reason
for an interior location equilibrium. Moreover, they focus on the extensive margin, while we analyze both
extensive and intensive margins and additionally consider pollution and environmental policy.
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Y . Production of good Y generates emissions that cause local or global environmental
damage. Both goods are traded on an integrated ‘world’ market between the two countries
without transportation costs, so prices are equalized across countries. We choose good
X as numeraire. Each country is populated by a representative household which owns
labor endowment as well as the firms located in its country and uses total income to
finance consumption of good X and good Y . Utility is determined by consumption utility
less environmental damage. Each government taxes emissions of domestic firms in the
Y -sector and redistributes the revenues to the household in its country by a lump sum
transfer. The timing is that governments first choose their tax policy, then firms make
their location decision (if this decision is endogenous) and, finally, households and firms
decide on consumption and production. We solve the model by backward induction.
Households. Consumption utility of the household in country i ∈ {A,B} is given by
U(xi, yi) = xi + Z(yi), (1)
where xi and yi is household i’s consumption of good X and good Y , respectively. The
function Z has the standard properties Z ′ > 0 > Z ′′. Moreover, we assume either Z and
its derivatives to be monotone, or consider the special case of a quadratic Z, so Z ′′′ ≥ 0.3
The household in country i receives the wage rate wi from inelastically supplying one
unit of labor as well as profit income Πxi and Πi from owning the domestic firms in sector
X and sector Y , respectively.4 The lump sum transfer from the government reads Ti.
Denoting the price of good Y by p, the budget constraint of the household in country i is
xi + pyi = wi + Π
x
i + Πi + Ti. (2)
It equates consumption expenditures for good X and good Y to wage income, profit
income and transfer income of the household in country i.
The household chooses xi and yi in order to maximize (1) subject to (2). The first-
order condition p = Z ′(yi) yields the demand function yi = Z
′−1(p). Aggregate demand
from both countries reads yi+yj = 2Z
′−1(p). If we denote the aggregate quantity of good
3Monotonicity of Z and its derivatives together with Z ′ > 0 > Z ′′ implies alternating signs of the
derivatives of Z, see Menegatti (2001). Note that this assumption together with the quadratic case
encompasses most functional specifications usually employed in economic models.
4To simplify later notation, we omit the superscript y at all variables pertaining to sector Y .
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Y supplied by the firms in country i by Qi, the equilibrium condition on the world market
for good Y is given by Qi +Qj = yi + yj = 2Z
′−1(p) or, equivalently,
p = Z ′
(
Qi +Qj
2
)
=: P (Qi +Qj). (3)
Equation (3) represents the inverse demand function for good Y . This function satisfies
P ′ = Z ′′/2 < 0 and P ′′ = Z ′′′/4 ≥ 0. Moreover, we assume P ′ + qi`P ′′ < 0, where
qi` is output of firm ` in the Y -Sector of country i. According to Dixit (1986), in the
standard Cournot oligopoly this condition is sufficient for the second-order condition of
profit maximization, for a negative slope of the firms’ reaction functions (output levels
are strategic substitutes) and for stability of the equilibrium. In an online appendix we
show that the condition has the same implications in our model.
Non-polluting sector and labor market. The number of firms in the non-polluting
X-sector is assumed to be large, so each individual firm acts as price taker both on
the input market and the output market. For notational convenience, we normalize the
number of X-firms to unity in each country. In country i, the X-firm uses the technology
Qxi = cL
x
i + δF (L
x
i ), (4)
where Qxi is output and L
x
i labor input. The production technology F satisfies F
′ > 0 >
F ′′. As with respect to Z, we consider either F and its derivatives to be monotone or the
special case of a quadratic F , so F ′′′ ≥ 0. The parameters c ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0 are introduced
for technical reasons. For δ = 0 the wage rate wi will be given by c, as we shall see below
in Section 4. Hence, our model encompasses the case of a fixed wage rate as special case.
This will be useful for comparing our analysis to previous studies. However, the main
focus of our analysis is the model specification with δ > 0 and an endogenous wage rate.
Profit of the firm in sector X of country i reads
Πxi = cL
x
i + δF (L
x
i )− wiLxi . (5)
Profit maximization yields wi = c+ δF
′(Lxi ), which is the inverse labor demand function
of sector X in country i. Since we will assume a one-to-one production technology in the
Y -sector, labor demand of the Y -sector in country i equals this sector’s aggregate output
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Qi. The equilibrium condition for the labor market in country i thus reads L
x
i +Qi = 1.
Inserting for Lxi in the first-order condition of firm X’s profit maximization yields
wi = c+ δF
′(1−Qi) =: C(Qi). (6)
Equation (6) gives the equilibrium wage rate in country i as a function of the aggregate
output in the Y -sector of this country. In the special case with δ = 0, the wage rate
is fixed and, thus, C ′ = C ′′ = 0. However, in our main case of interest with δ > 0 we
obtain C ′ = −δF ′′ > 0 and C ′′ = δF ′′′ ≥ 0, i.e. the wage rate in country i is increasing in
aggregate output of sector Y in country i at non-decreasing rates. The reason is that a
higher output in the Y -sector relocates labor from the numeraire good sector into sector
Y and thereby increases marginal productivity of labor in the numeraire good sector.
Polluting sector with exogenous location decision. The total number of firms in
the Y -sector is 2k, while the number of firms located in the Y -sector of country i is denoted
by ki, where ki + kj = 2k with i, j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j.5 We first assume an exogenous
and symmetric location of polluting firms with ki = kj = k. Firm ` in the Y -sector of
country i has an output of qi` units. We suppose a one-to-one relation between output
and emissions generated in sector Y . Thus, qi` also measures the amount of emissions of
firm ` in country i. The government of country i taxes these emissions by the unit tax
rate τi. After-tax profits of firm ` in country i can then be written as
πi` =
[
P (Qi,−` + qi` +Qj)− C(Qi,−` + qi`)− τi
]
qi`, (7)
where Qi,−` := Qi − qi` is aggregate output of all other firms in sector Y of country i.
According to (7), profits equal revenues less labor costs and tax payments.
We assume that k is small enough for the firms in the Y -sector to be imperfectly
competitive à la Cournot-Nash on the input market and the output market.6 Formally,
this implies that the Y -firms take into account their impact on the output price P as well
as on the wage rate C. While the impact on P is standard in Cournot-Nash models, the
impact on C deserves some motivation. At first glance, an inconsistency is that on each
5For sake of convenience, we follow the procedure employed by, e.g., Requate (1997) and Haufler and
Wooton (2010) and do not require ki to be an integer.
6Each firm may, e.g., possess sector-specific knowledge that allows this firm to produce the good. The
knowledge is protected by patents, which creates a barrier to entry. See Haufler and Wooton (2010).
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local labor market firms from the Y -sector compete with firms from the X-sector, which
are assumed to act under perfect competition on the labor market. This inconsistency is
resolved, however, by implicitly assuming that the size of firms in the Y -sector is large
relative to the aggregate (!) size of the firms in the X-sector. One general motivation for
such an assumption may be the empirical finding of high levels of market concentrations
in US labor markets (cf. Azar et al., 2017, 2018). More specific for our framework where
in a later section we assume that Y -firms are internationally mobile, we may even refer to
the strong empirical evidence that multinational enterprises have significant influence on
local labor markets and wages. For instance, there is evidence for a multinational wage
premium and wage spillovers to local establishments (cf. Aitken et al., 1996; Girma et al.,
2001; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004; Tomohara and Takii, 2011).
Firm ` in the Y -sector of country i maximizes (7) with respect to output qi`, taking
as given the output decision of all other firms in the Y -sector. Focusing on a symmetric
equilibrium with qi` = qi and Qi = kiqi, the first-order condition reads
P (kiqi + kjqj) + qiP
′(kiqi + kjqj)− C(kiqi)− qiC ′(kiqi)− τi = 0. (8)
Equation (8) has the interpretation that an individual firm equates marginal revenues,
P + qiP
′, to marginal production costs, C + qiC
′, plus the emissions tax rate, τi. Due to
our assumption that firms take into account their impact on the wage rate, the marginal
production costs not only comprise the wage rate, C, but also the change in production
costs via a change in the wage rate, i.e. qiC
′.
Totally differentiating (8) and the corresponding equation for Y -firms in country j,
taking into account Qi = kqi and Qj = kqj and evaluating the results at a symmetric
situation with qi = qj =: q and Qi = Qj =: Q, it is straightforward to prove
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
= k
∂qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
=
kΓ
Ω
< 0,
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
= k
∂qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
= −k
2X
Ω
> 0, (9)
∂(Qi +Qj)
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
=
k(P ′ − C ′ − kΨ)
Ω
< 0, (10)
where the subscript ‘ex’ indicates the case with an exogenously given location decision of
firms and where, for notational convenience, we introduce
X := P ′ + qP ′′ < 0, Ψ := C ′ + qC ′′ > 0,
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Γ := k(X −Ψ) + P ′ − C ′ < 0, Ω := Γ2 − k2X 2 > 0.
The sign of the Jacobian Ω follows from rewriting it as Ω = 2kX (P ′ − C ′ − kΨ) + (P ′ −
C ′ − kΨ)2 > 0. The rationale of these insights is that the tax rate increase in country i
gives the polluting firms in the Y -sector of country i a competitive disadvantage relative
to their competitors in country j. Hence, the Y -firms in country i produce and sell fewer
units of good Y and thereby reduce their emissions, whereas the Y -firms in country j
raise their output and emissions, as formally shown in equation (9). The latter effect is
the leakage effect identified, e.g., in Felder and Rutherford (1993) and Babiker (2005) and
empirically studied by Aichele and Felbermayr (2015). According to equation (10), leakage
is incomplete in our model since aggregate output and emissions from both countries are
lowered by the increase in the emissions tax rate in country i.
Polluting sector with endogenous location decision. Given the distribution of
firms (ki, kj), profit maximization again yields the first-order condition (8). In order to
describe the firms’ location decision, let πi and πj be the equilibrium profits of firms located
in country i and country j, respectively. Firms locate in the country where equilibrium
profits are higher. If πi > πj, then firms move from country j to country i, and vice
versa. A location equilibrium is reached if profits in both countries are equalized. Using
profits (7) and taking into account symmetry in each country, i.e. qi` = qi and qj` = qj,
the conditions of the location equilibrium can be written as[
P (kiqi + kjqj)− C(kiqi)− τi
]
qi −
[
P (kiqi + kjqj)− C(kjqj)− τj
]
qj = 0, (11)
ki + kj = 2k. (12)
Condition (11) equalizes equilibrium profits across countries, while condition (12) ensures
that the number of firms located in the two countries is equal to the total number of firms.
Note that an interior solution of the location equilibrium is ensured by our assumption of
endogenous wage rates. If wage rates were fixed at C(·) = c, we would obtain a bang-bang
solution: For τi > τj, all firms would locate in country j, and vice versa. With endogenous
wages, by contrast, the relocation of firms comes to a halt by adjustments of C.
Equations (11), (12) and (8) for i and j determine the firms’ output, qi and qj, and the
firms’ distribution, ki and kj, as functions of the emissions tax rates, τi and τj. Totally
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differentiating and evaluating the results at a symmetric situation with qi = qj =: q,
ki = kj = k, and τi = τj =: τ , the appendix derives the comparative static results
∂qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
=
π̃Ψ− qC ′(P ′ − C ′) + q2C ′′(Γ + kX )
Ω̃
T 0, (13)
∂qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
=
π̃Ψ− qC ′(P ′ − C ′)− q2C ′′(Γ + kX )
Ω̃
< 0, (14)
∂ki
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
= − ∂kj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
=
(Γ + kX )
[
− π̃ + q(P ′ − C ′)− q2kC ′′
]
qΩ̃
< 0, (15)
where the subscript ‘en’ indicates the case of an endogenous location decision and where
the equilibrium profit per unit of output and the Jacobian can be written as, respectively,
π̃ := P − C − τ ≥ 0, Ω̃ := 2(Γ + kX )
[
π̃Ψ− qC ′(P ′ − C ′)
]
< 0.
The rationale behind (13)–(15) is different from the case with exogenous location decision.
The main channel of emissions leakage is now the relocation of firms. The increase in
country i’s tax rate reduces equilibrium profits of firms in country i and, thus, gives
firms an incentive to move to country j. The wage rate falls in country i and increases
in country j until equilibrium profits are again equalized across countries. Hence, the
number of firms falls in country i, while it increases in country j, as shown in (15). Since
there are now more firms in country j, each of these firms produces less, according to (14).
Similarly, the reduction of firms in country i gives each firm in this country an incentive
to increase output. However, since the tax rate has been increased in country i there is a
countervailing negative effect on output. The overall sign of the effect on the individual
firm’s output in country i is therefore indeterminate, as can be seen in (13).
The effects of emission taxes on aggregate output and emissions in the two countries
are obtained from Qi = kiqi and Qj = kjqj. The appendix shows
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
=
−π̃
[
Γ + k(X −Ψ)
]
+ q(P ′ − C ′)[Γ + kX − kC ′
]
Ω̃
< 0, (16)
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
=
π̃
[
Γ + k(X + Ψ)
]
− q(P ′ − C ′)[Γ + kX + kC ′
]
Ω̃
> 0, (17)
∂(Qi +Qj)
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
=
2k
[
π̃Ψ− qC ′(P ′ − C ′)
]
Ω̃
=
k(P ′ − C ′ − kΨ)
Ω
< 0, (18)
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where the sign of (17) follows from Γ+k(X +Ψ) = 2kX +P ′−C ′ < 0 and Γ+kX +kC ′ =
2kX + P ′ − C ′ − qkC ′′ < 0. Equations (16)–(18) show that we obtain qualitatively the
same results as in the case with exogenous location: An increase in country i’s tax rate
reduces total output and emissions in this country, see (16), while it increases total output
and emissions in the other country, see (17). We obtain emissions leakage, which is again
incomplete, since total emissions from both countries fall according to (18).
Comparison between exogenous and endogenous location decision. For the
intuition of our main results derived below, it is important to compare the comparative
static results in the cases of exogenous and endogenous location. In the appendix we show
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
<
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
< 0,
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
>
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
> 0, (19)
∂(Qi +Qj)
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
=
∂(Qi +Qj)
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
< 0. (20)
According to (19), an increase in country i’s tax rate leads to a larger decrease (increase) in
country i’s (country j’s) output and emissions when firms are mobile instead of immobile.
The gap between the decrease in country i’s output and the increase in country i’s output
therefore becomes larger when we move from exogenous to endogenous location. The
reason is that with mobile firms the increase in country i’s tax rate not only impacts the
output of firms, but it also lowers the number of firms in country i for the benefit of
country j. This relocation of firms amplifies both the fall in country i’s total output and
the increase in country j’s total output. Interestingly, the larger decrease in country i’s
output and the larger increase in country j’s output just offset each other. Accordingly,
the effect of country i’s tax rate on worldwide output and emissions is the same, regardless
of whether the firms’ location decision is exogenous or endogenous, as shown by (20).
3 Strategic Environmental Policy
Welfare function. Social welfare of country i consists of consumption utility (1) less
environmental damage. We model environmental damage in country i by the function
ϕD(Qi + ηQj), (21)
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with ϕ ≥ 0 and η ∈ [0, 1] as well as D′ > 0, D′′ ≥ 0. The parameter ϕ allows us to
consider the case without environmental damage, i.e. the special case with ϕ = 0. The
parameter η is introduced to differentiate between local and transboundary pollution. For
η = 0, emissions in country i cause damage only in this country. For η > 0, by contrast,
we have emissions spillovers, so emissions in country i also cause environmental damage
in country j. The case of η = 1 approximates the case of global warming; it is then
irrelevant for the environmental damage in which country the emissions are generated.
Using (1), (2), and (21), welfare in country i can be written as
wi + Π
x
i + Πi + T
i − pyi + Z(yi)− ϕD(Qi + ηQj). (22)
Inserting (6) and Lxi = 1 − Qi into (5) gives profit income from the X-sector, i.e Πxi =
δF (1−Qi) + [c−C(Qi)](1−Qi). Summing up (7) over all ki firms in country i and using
Qi = kiqi yields the profit income from the Y -sector equal to Πi = [P (Qi +Qj)−C(Qi)−
τi]Qi. Emissions tax revenues in country i amount to Ti = τiQi. The price p and the wage
rate wi can be replaced by (3) and (6), respectively. Finally, recall that yi = (Qi +Qj)/2.
Inserting all this into (22) and canceling common terms gives
V (Qi, Qj) := c(1−Qi) + δF (1−Qi) + Z
(
Qi +Qj
2
)
+
Qi −Qj
2
Z ′
(
Qi +Qj
2
)
− ϕD(Qi + ηQj). (23)
Wage and tax payments of firms cancel out against wage and transfer income of the
household. What remains in country i’s welfare (23) is the utility of good X, equal to
the output of the X-sector, c(1−Qi) + δF (1−Qi), the utility of good Y , represented by
Z[(Qi + Qj)/2], environmental damage, equal to −ϕD(Qi + ηQj), and a term reflecting
the success of the Y -sector in country i relatively to the Y -sector in country j, measured
by the value of country i’s exports, (Qi − Qj)Z ′[(Qi + Qj)/2]/2. The value of exports
stems from the difference of the Y -sectors’ revenues P (Qi + Qj)Qi and the households’
expenditures P (Qi + Qj)(Qi + Qj)/2 (remember that yi = (Qi + Qj)/2 and Z
′ = P ).
Country i’s welfare (23) depends on the tax rates τi and τj, since output volumes Qi and
Qj depend on these tax rates according to our comparative static results derived above.
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Cooperative solution. As benchmark, we first derive the cooperative (efficient) emis-
sion tax rates which maximize joint welfare of both countries. Joint welfare equals
V (Qi, Qj) + V (Qj, Qi) = c(1−Qi) + δF (1−Qi) + c(1−Qj) + δF (1−Qj)
+ 2Z
(
Qi +Qj
2
)
− ϕD(Qi + ηQj)− ϕD(Qj + ηQi). (24)
It encompasses utility of good X and good Y and environmental damage in both countries.
In contrast to the individual country’s welfare (23), the value of exports does not play a
role in joint welfare, since the countries’ values of exports cancel out.
As both countries are structurally identical, we focus on the symmetric solution
τi = τ
∗ of joint welfare maximization. For equal tax rates, also the output and emission
levels are equal and denoted by Qi = Q
∗. We furthermore obtain F ′(1−Qi) = F ′(1−Q∗)
and D
[
Qi + ηQj
]
= D
[
(1 + η)Q∗
]
. Setting the derivative of (24) with respect to τi equal
to zero, applying the symmetry property and taking into account that ∂(Qi+Qj)/∂τi < 0
due to (10) or (18), we obtain the first-order condition for the cooperative solution
Z ′(Q∗) = c+ δF ′(1−Q∗) + ϕ(1 + η)D′
[
(1 + η)Q∗
]
. (25)
To understand the intuition of this efficiency condition, remember from the previous
section that an increase in country i’s tax rate reduces output of the Y -sector in country
i and increases output of the Y -sector in country j. Total output of the Y -sector and,
thus, consumption of good Y in both countries fall. Via local labor markets, output
of the X-sector increases in country i and decreases in country j. Pollution in country i
decreases since leakage is incomplete, while pollution in country j may increase or decrease
depending on the spillover parameter η. In country i, these changes lead to a reduction in
utility of good Y , represented by 1
2
Z ′(·)(∂Qi/∂τi + ∂Qj/∂τi) < 0, an increase in utility of
good X, given by −[c+ δF ′(·)]∂Qi/∂τi > 0, and a fall in environmental damage, reflected
by −ϕD′(·)(∂Qi/∂τi + η ∂Qj/∂τi) > 0. In country j, we obtain a reduction in utility
of good Y , represented by 1
2
Z ′(·)(∂Qj/∂τi + ∂Qi/∂τi) < 0, a decrease in utility of good
X, given by −[c + δF ′(·)]∂Qj/∂τi < 0, and a change in environmental damage, reflected
by −ϕD′(·)(∂Qj/∂τi + η ∂Qi/∂τi) T 0. The cooperative tax rate equalizes the sum of
all these marginal welfare effects to zero. Due to symmetry, the terms Z ′, c + δF ′ and
ϕD′ are the same in both countries. We may thus factor out the change in total output
∂(Qi + Qj)/∂τi and arrive at (25). Intuitively, this equation states that for good Y the
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marginal utility Z ′ is equal to the opportunity costs c+δF ′, representing marginal output
and utility of good X, plus the marginal environmental damage ϕ(1+η)D′. With Z ′ = P
and c + δF ′ = C from (3) and (6), we obtain the alternative interpretation that the
efficient emission tax rate equates the price of good Y , on the one hand, and the marginal
production and environmental costs of good Y , on the other hand.
Using (25) together with Z ′ = P and c+ δF ′ = C from (3) and (6) in (8), we obtain
τ ∗ = ϕ(1 + η)D′
[
(1 + η)Q∗
]
+
Q∗
k
P ′(2Q∗)− Q
∗
k
C ′(Q∗). (26)
This expressions gives the efficient emissions tax rate which equals the marginal environ-
mental damage, ϕ(1 + η)D′, corrected by terms reflecting the market power of firms in
the Y -sector on the output market, Q∗P ′/k, and on the input market, Q∗C ′/k. Hence,
efficiency requires underinternalization of the marginal damage, ϕ(1 + η)D′, since the
efficient emissions tax rate not only has to internalize the environmental externality by
imposing a tax, but also the market power of firms by granting a subsidy.7
Non-cooperative solution with exogenous location decision. Non-cooperation is
modeled as a Nash policy game where country i chooses τi in order to maximize own
welfare (23), taking into account the comparative static effects derived in the previous
section and taking as given the choice of the tax rate τj by country j. We first focus on
a fixed firm distribution with ki = kj = k. Symmetry now implies τi =: τ
ex, Qi =: Q
ex,
F ′(1−Qi) = F ′(1−Qex), and D
[
Qi + ηQj
]
= D
[
(1 + η)Qex
]
. Differentiating (23) with
respect to τi and applying symmetry afterwards, the Nash equilibrium condition becomes
Z ′(Qex) = c+ δF ′(1−Qex) + ϕD′
[
(1 + η)Qex
](
1 + η
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
)
. (27)
Using (27), Z ′ = P and c+ δF ′ = C in (8) yields for the equilibrium tax rate
τ ex = ϕD′
[
(1 + η)Qex
](
1 + η
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
)
+
Qex
k
P ′(2Qex)− Q
ex
k
C ′(Qex). (28)
Comparing the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium described by (27) and (28) with the
efficient policy in (25) and (26), the appendix proves
7This argument was first put forward by Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980) for the case of a
monopoly and Ebert (1992) for oligopolistic market structures.
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Proposition 1. (i) If ϕ = 0 or η = 0, then τex = τ ∗ and Qex = Q∗. (ii) If ϕ > 0 and
η > 0, then τex < τ ∗ and Qex > Q∗.
According to part (i) of Proposition 1, the non-cooperative policy choice may be efficient.
This is the case if there is no environmental externality at all (ϕ = 0) or if emissions do not
cause cross-border spillovers (η = 0). In the absence of environmental damage (ϕ = 0),
the efficient tax rate (26) and the Nash equilibrium tax rate (28) are equal to τ ∗ = τ ex =
Qex(P ′ − C ′)/k < 0 and represent a subsidy which corrects for imperfect competition
in the input and output markets of sector Y . In the case of local pollution (ϕ > 0 and
η = 0), the two tax rates additionally reflect the marginal environmental damage and
may thus become positive and reflect a tax instead of a subsidy. Only with environmental
externality and cross-border spillovers (ϕ > 0 and η > 0), the non-cooperative policy
deviates from the efficient one. In this case, the non-cooperative emissions tax rate is
inefficiently low (τ ex < τ ∗), implying an inefficiently high output and inefficiently high
emissions under non-cooperation (Qex > Q∗), as shown in part (ii) of Proposition 1.
At first glance, one may conjecture that the efficiency result in part (i) of Proposition 1
is obtained because without environmental pollution (ϕ = 0) or emissions spillovers (η =
0), there are no cross-border effects between the two countries. But the rationale is more
complicated than this. Even for ϕ = 0 or η = 0, a tax rate change in one country has
an effect on firms and households in the other country via changes in output in the other
country, as shown by the comparative static result (9) which is independent of ϕ and η.
Hence, the efficiency result comes as surprise. In order to resolve this puzzle, we take a
look at the policy externality, i.e. the effect of country i’s emissions tax rate on welfare
in country j. This effect is ignored by country i in setting its tax rate non-cooperatively
and, thus, it explains the difference between the Nash policy equilibrium and the efficient
solution. Formally, differentiating (23) yields the policy externality
∂V (Qj, Qi)
∂τi
= CE + PE (29)
with
CE =
[
Z ′(Qex)− c− δF ′(1−Qex)
] ∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
, (30)
PE = −ϕD′
[
(1 + η)Qex
]( ∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
+ η
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
)
. (31)
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The total externality can be decomposed into a consumption externality CE and a pol-
lution externality PE. The consumption externality CE reflects the change in country j’s
welfare due to the fall in utility of good Y given by 1
2
Z ′(·)(∂Qj/∂τi+∂Qi/∂τi)|ex < 0, the
decrease in utility of good X equal to −[c+δF ′(·)](∂Qj/∂τi)|ex < 0 and the increase in the
value of exports reflected by 1
2
Z ′(·)(∂Qj/∂τi− ∂Qi/∂τi)|ex > 0. The pollution externality
PE equals the change in damage given by −ϕD′(·)(∂Qj/∂τi + η ∂Qi/∂τi)|ex T 0.
In the absence of environmental damage (ϕ = 0), it is obvious that the pollution
externality is zero (PE = 0). Moreover, the Nash equilibrium condition (27) becomes
Z ′ = c+ δF ′, implying that the welfare effects on utility of good Y , utility of good X and
exports in country j just offset each other and drive down the consumption externality in
(30) to zero (CE = 0). Hence, in the absence of environmental pollution, the tax rate in the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is efficient since both subexternalities, CE and PE, and
thereby the total policy externality in (29) are indeed zero. But in case of local pollution
(ϕ > 0, η = 0), the pollution externality is strictly negative (PE = −ϕD′(·)(∂Qj/∂τi)|ex <
0), since due to emission leakage a tax rate increase in country i increases emissions and,
thus, damage in country j, even in the absence of emission spillovers. Moreover, the
Nash equilibrium condition (27) now implies Z ′ = c+ δF ′ + ϕD′. Inserting this into (30)
yields CE = −PE. Hence, in case of local pollution the non-cooperative tax rates become
efficient not because there are no cross-country effects of tax policy, as conjectured at first
glance, but since the two subexternalities CE and PE just offset each other.
In order to explain part (ii) of Proposition 1, note that for global pollution (ϕ >
0, η > 0) the sign of both subexternalities (30) and (31) is indeterminate, in general.
However, taking into account the Nash equilibrium condition (27) in order to replace
Z ′ − c− δF ′ in CE defined in (30), we can show after some rearrangements that
CE + PE = −ηϕD′
[
(1 + η)Qex
] [( ∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
)2
−
(
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
)2]/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
> 0. (32)
The sign of equation (32) follows from the fact that leakage is incomplete, i.e. (∂Qj/∂τi)|ex <
−(∂Qi/∂τi)|ex due to (10). Hence, the sum of the two subexternalities is positive and in
the Nash equilibrium the non-cooperative emissions tax rate is inefficiently low.
Non-cooperative solution with endogenous location decision. If the location
decision of firms is endogenous, we obtain the same Nash equilibrium condition as in
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(27), the same equilibrium emissions tax rate as in (28) and the same policy externalities
as in (29)–(31), except that we have to replace Qex by Qen and the comparative static
effects (9) and (10) by (16)–(18). Based on these changes, the appendix proves
Proposition 2. (i) If ϕ = 0 or η = 0, then τen = τex = τ ∗ and Qen = Qex = Q∗. (ii) If
ϕ > 0 and η > 0, then τen < τex < τ ∗ and Qen > Qex > Q∗.
According to part (i) of Proposition 2, without environmental damage (ϕ = 0) or with
local pollution (ϕ > 0, η = 0), the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with an endogenous
location decision of firms is efficient, as in the case with an exogenous location decision.
By contrast, with global environmental pollution (ϕ > 0, η > 0), the inefficiency of the
non-cooperative Nash emissions tax rates is aggravated when we move from an exogenous
to an endogenous location decision, as shown in part (ii) of Proposition 2.
The rationale of these insights goes again back to the externalities in (29)–(31), now
with the comparative static effects in (16)–(18) instead of (9) and (10). Without environ-
mental damage (ϕ = 0), both the consumption externality CE in (30) and the pollution
externality PE in (31) are again zero, implying an efficient policy choice in the Nash
equilibrium, as shown in part (i) of Proposition 2. In the presence of an environmental
externality (ϕ > 0), both subexternalities are non-zero and larger in absolute terms than
in the case of an exogenous location decision, since from (19) we know that leakage is
larger if firms in the Y -sector are mobile instead of immobile. In case of local pollution
(ϕ > 0 and η = 0), however, both CE and PE are aggravated to the same extent, so the
sum of both remains zero and the equilibrium tax rates are again efficient, as stated in
part (i) of Proposition 2. If pollution is global (ϕ > 0 and η > 0), by contrast, equation
(32) shows that the larger spread between CE and PE under firm mobility increases the
inefficiency of the equilibrium tax rate as well as the equilibrium output and emissions
compared to the case with immobile firm, as shown in part (ii) of Proposition 2.
4 Discussion
Comparison to autarky. In our model, autarky means that firms are immobile and
there is trade neither in good X nor good Y . The analysis of the X-sector remains
unchanged in this case, leading again to (6). The household’s demand decision in country
i again implies p = Z ′(yi). Since there is no trade in good Y , however, market clearing
18
now gives yi = Qi and the demand function becomes p = Z
′(Qi) =: P̃ (Qi). In an
online appendix we show that the effect of country i’s tax rate on output in country i
is still negative, i.e. (∂Qi/∂τi)|aut < 0, and that the effect of country i’s tax rate on
output in country j vanishes, i.e. (∂Qj/∂τi)|aut = 0, where the index ‘aut’ indicates the
non-cooperative solution under autarky. Welfare of country i turns into
Ṽ (Qi, Qj) := c(1−Qi) + δF (1−Qi) + Z(Qi)− ϕD(Qi + ηQj). (33)
Maximizing Ṽ (Qi, Qj) + Ṽ (Qj, Qi) yields the same efficiency condition (25) as under free
trade. By contrast, from (33) the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium condition becomes
Z ′(Qaut) = c+ δF ′(1−Qaut) + ϕD
[
(1 + η)Qaut
]
, (34)
Comparing (25) and (34), we see that the only cross-country effect which country i does
not take into account in its non-cooperative policy choice under autarky is the emission
spill-over of its output Qi. In terms of externalities, we obtain a positive pollution exter-
nality equal to P̃E = −ηϕD′[(1 + η)Qaut](∂Qi/∂τi)|aut > 0. Hence, also under autarky
the non-cooperative tax rate τaut is inefficiently low. Moreover, in the online appendix
we show that the policy externality is smaller, and the emissions tax rate thereby larger,
under autarky than under free trade. This implies that we can decompose the inefficiency
of the non-cooperative emissions policy into three parts: inefficiency due to free-riding
(τ ∗ > τaut), strategic incentives (τaut > τ ex), and firm mobility (τ ex > τ en).
The role of endogenous wage rates. Beside ensuring an interior location equilibrium
in the presence of mobile firms, the endogeneity of wage rates also has an impact on the
degree of inefficiency of the non-cooperative policy equilibrium. In order to illustrate, we
focus on the case with immobile firms and compare model results with endogenous wage
rates, i.e. δ > 0 and C(Qi) = c+ δF
′(1−Qi), to outcomes with exogenous wage rates, i.e.
δ = 0 and C(Qi) = c. Unfortunately, this analysis is not tractable in the case of general
functional forms of Z and F . However, in an online appendix we show that moving from
exogenous to endogenous wage rates reduces the gap between the efficient solution and
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, if Z and F are quadratic and thereby P and C are
linear. The rationale of this insight is as follows: Suppose country i decreases its tax rate.
The corresponding increase in the domestic firms’ output is determined by the reduction
in the after-tax marginal production costs. This reduction is smaller under endogenous
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than under exogenous wage rates since in the former case domestic marginal labor costs
increase due to the higher output and counteract the fall in the tax rate. At the same
time, the increase of domestic firms’ output induces the foreign firms in sector Y to cut
back their production causing a reduction in the foreign wage rate. This attenuates the
rise in the domestic firms’ competitiveness further. Hence, with endogenous wages, the
government can to a smaller extent use a tax reduction to improve the market position
and, hence, increase the profits of its domestic firms. Accordingly, the deviation of non-
cooperative tax setting from the first-best is less pronounced, when taking into account
the general equilibrium effect of endogenous wages.
The role of imperfect competition. In order to highlight the role of imperfect com-
petition, consider perfectly competitive firms in the Y -sector. Instead of (8), profit maxi-
mization in the Y -sector then yields P (Qi+Qj)−C(Qi)−τi = 0 and P (Qi+Qj)−C(Qj)−
τj = 0. Inserting into (11) and (12), we see that the condition of the location equilibrium
is always fulfilled and any firm distribution constitutes an equilibrium. Focusing on the
symmetric distribution with ki = kj = k, it is then obvious that the cases of exogenous
and endogenous firm location are identical. Therefore, under perfect competition the
non-cooperative policy is always independent of whether firms are mobile or immobile
(τ ex = τ en and Qex = Qen). Put differently, imperfect competition is the reason why
mobility of firms renders the non-cooperative policy even more inefficient. The intuition
is that with perfect competition, all Y -firms have zero profits and, thus, no government
can provide firms tax incentives to relocate, in contrast to imperfect competition.
Note, however, that for ϕ > 0 and η > 0 the non-cooperative solution remains ineffi-
cient under perfect competition. Differentiating the above first-order conditions yields
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
=
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
=
P ′ − C ′
C ′ (C ′ − 2P ′)
< 0,
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
=
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
=
−P ′
C ′ (C ′ − 2P ′)
> 0. (35)
Conditions (25) and (27) for the cooperative and non-cooperative policy, respectively,
remain unchanged. Due to the signs in (35), we can use the same steps as in the proof
of Propositions 1 and 2 in order to show τ ex = τ en < τ ∗ and Qex = Qen > Q∗ if ϕ > 0
and η > 0. Hence, also under perfect competition non-cooperation yields inefficiently
low emission taxes and inefficiently high emission levels. Intuitively, even under per-
fect competition emission leakage is incomplete since (35) implies [∂(Qi + Qj)/∂τi]|ex =
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−1/(C ′ − 2P ′) < 0. The sum of the consumption externality CE and the pollution
externalities PE in (32) therefore remains positive, explaining inefficient undertaxation.
The role of the integrated market. To explain the difference between our efficiency
result in the absence of pollution and the inefficiency result derived by the literature on
strategic trade policy, we set ϕ = 0 and deviate from our integrated market assumption.
Instead, we follow a large part of the strategic trade policy literature (Brander, 1995)
and consider a model version with a third country C. Only country C consumes good
Y , whereas this good is produced solely in the other two countries. We focus on the case
with an exogenous location decision. The case with firm mobility is analogous.
In country C, all labor is used in the numeraire sector, so the wage rate becomes wC =
c+ δF ′(1) and profits read ΠxC = δ[F (1)− F ′(1)]. The household has utility Z(yC) + xC ,
and the budget is xC+pyC = m with the fixed income m := wC+Π
x
C = c+δF (1). Demand
for good Y satisfies the first-order condition p = Z ′(yC). The market clearing condition
for good Y is yC = Qi+Qj, so the demand function reads p = Z
′(Qi+Qj) =: P̂ (Qi+Qj).
Welfare in country C can therefore be computed as
V̂ C(Qi, Qj) := m+ Z(Qi +Qj)− (Qi +Qj)Z ′(Qi +Qj). (36)
It equals the fixed income plus utility less payments for good Y (remember Z ′ = P ). In
country i ∈ {A,B}, both production sectors remain unchanged, except for the change in
the demand function for good Y . Hence, we again obtain (4)–(10), but now with P̂ , P̂ ′
and P̂ ′′ instead of P , P ′ and P ′′, respectively. Utility Z(yi) and expenditures pyi vanish
from welfare (22). Taking into account ϕ = 0, instead of (23) we obtain
V̂ (Qi, Qj) := c(1−Qi) + δF (1−Qi) +QiZ ′(Qi +Qj). (37)
The term QiZ
′(·) is the value of country i’s exports of good Y to the third country.
Accordingly, in joint welfare V̂ (Qi, Qj) + V̂ (Qj, Qi) we obtain the term (Qi + Qj)Z
′(·)
which represents exports of both countries to the third country.
The cooperative solution between all three countries maximizes V̂ C(Qi, Qj)+V̂ (Qi, Qj)+
V̂ (Qj, Qi). Differentiating gives the first-order condition
Z ′(2Q̂∗) = c+ δF ′(1− Q̂∗), (38)
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which has the same interpretation as (25) for ϕ = 0. The partial cooperative policy
between A and B maximizes V̂ (Qi, Qj) + V̂ (Qj, Qi) and satisfies
Z ′(2Q̂∗∗) = c+ δF ′(1− Q̂∗∗)− 2Q̂∗∗Z ′′(2Q̂∗∗). (39)
From the point of view of the two producing countries, Z ′ on the LHS can be interpreted
as a marginal costs of a tax rate increase, since the higher tax reduces total output Qi+Qj
and, for constant price P = Z ′, export revenues. The RHS gives the producing countries’
marginal benefits of a tax rate increase, consisting of the higher output in the numeraire
sector, c+ δF ′, and an increase in the export value due to a price increase, −2Q∗∗Z ′′, for
constant output. Hence, partial cooperation ignores the corresponding increase in country
C’s import expenditures, amounting to a negative import externality inflicted on country
C. The non-cooperative solution maximizes (37) and satisfies
Z ′(2Q̂ex) = c+ δF ′(1− Q̂ex)− Q̂exZ ′′(2Q̂ex)
(
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
+
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
)/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
. (40)
In contrast to partial cooperation, country i now not only ignores the negative effect of
its tax rate increase on the imports of the third country, but also the positive effect on
country j’s value of exports, caused by an increase in output Qj, for constant export
price, and an increase in the export price P = Z ′, for constant output. This constitutes
a positive export externality on country j, reflected by the last term on the RHS of (40).
Based on these insights, we prove in an online appendix that the non-cooperative tax
rate is smaller, and output larger, than under partial cooperation. This result is caused
by the positive export externality and coincides with the inefficiency result derived in the
strategic trade policy literature, see e.g. Brander (1995).8 If we compare non-cooperative
taxes with full cooperation, the negative import externality comes into play. This exter-
nality overcompensates the positive export externality, since trade balance implies that
changes in export and import values are equal in absolute terms and since country i takes
into account a part of the change in the export value, namely the effect on its own exports.
Hence, the sum of the import and export externalities is negative, implying that tax rates
are higher (subsidies lower) under non-cooperation than under full cooperation.
8To avoid clutter in notation, we have stuck here to the analysis of taxes instead of subsidies. Both
approaches are equivalent, however, if we replace the tax by a subsidy σi := −τi. Our analysis then
implies that the non-cooperative subsidy is higher than under partial cooperation, as in Brander (1995).
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5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the literature on strategic environmental policy by integrating two
aspects into the general framework. First, we add firm mobility directly to the analysis.
This allows us to compare policy effects on the intensive and extensive margins. Moreover,
we can highlight when and how the mobility of polluting firms amplifies the deviation
of the non-cooperative policy setting from the welfare-maximizing outcome. Second, we
endogenize the production costs of polluting firms by using a general equilibrium approach
including the labor market. Wage responses to output and location changes of mobile
firms ensure an interior solution of the location equilibrium. Moreover, we show how
this general equilibrium effect countervails strategic motives of non-cooperatively acting
policy-makers and reduces the inefficiency of decentralized policy.
Our main results show that decentralized policy-setting with mobile firms does not
necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes. This efficiency result is obtained in the case of
only local pollution, and in the absence of any environmental damage. By contrast, with
transboundary pollution, non-cooperative policy-setting is inefficient, and the mobility of
polluting firms aggravates the inefficiency. By additionally considering the benchmark of
an autarky economy, we show that the inefficiency of non-cooperative tax rates can be
decomposed in a first part caused by the standard free-riding incentives in decentralized
environmental policy, a second part implied by the strategic incentives of governments to
promote the firms located in their countries, and a third part generated by firm mobility.
The game-theoretic literature on climate policy (e.g., Barrett 1994) helps to explain
why many countries do not regulate their emissions of greenhouse gases in a way compat-
ible with, e.g., the 2-degree Celsius target: free-riding prevents them from internalizing
environmental externalities on other countries, and cooperation is hard to achieve. Yet,
this does not explain why so many countries until today fail to implement any carbon
price at all. If free-riding were the only problem, countries should nevertheless imple-
ment positive carbon prices to regulate those externalities that accrue within their own
boundaries. Our analysis points towards competitiveness concerns as another reason (in
addition to free-riding) why countries may shy away from regulating their emissions uni-
laterally. Interestingly, Helm and Schmidt (2015) show that border carbon adjustment
(BCA) can help to address the free-rider problem, thereby triggering higher participation
in a climate change agreement. Hence, our analysis raises the question whether BCA
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can also mitigate the flaws caused by competitiveness considerations in unilateral climate
policy. The corresponding analysis of BCA in the context of our modeling framework goes
beyond the scope of this paper, but might be a good starting point for future research.
Appendix
Proof of (13)–(18). Let q̂i := (∂qi/∂τi)|en, k̂i := (∂ki/∂τi)|en, Q̂i := (∂Qi/∂τi)|en,
q̂j := (∂qj/∂τi)|en, k̂j := (∂kj/∂τi)|en, Q̂j := (∂Qj/∂τi)|en, q̂ := [∂(qi + qj)/∂τi]|en and
Q̂ := [∂(Qi + Qj)/∂τi]|en. In a symmetric situation we have q̂ = q̂i + q̂j, Q̂i = qk̂i + kq̂i
and Q̂ = Q̂i + Q̂j = kq̂ since k̂i + k̂j = 0 due to (12). Totally differentiating (11) together
with (8) for i and j with respect to dτi and applying the symmetry property yields
π̃(q̂i − q̂j) + q[C ′(Q̂j − Q̂i)− 1] = 0, (41)
X Q̂+ P ′q̂i −ΨQ̂i − C ′q̂i − 1 = 0, (42)
X Q̂+ P ′q̂j −ΨQ̂j − C ′q̂j = 0. (43)
Defining ∆q̂ := q̂j − q̂i and ∆Q̂ := Q̂j − Q̂i, we can rewrite (41)–(43) as
−π̃∆q̂ + q(C ′∆Q̂− 1) = 0, (44)
2Xkq̂ + P ′q̂ −Ψkq̂ − C ′q̂ − 1 = 0, (45)
P ′∆q̂ −Ψ∆Q̂− C ′∆q̂ + 1 = 0, (46)
where (45) and (46) follow from adding and subtracting (42) and (43), respectively, and
where we used Q̂ = kq̂. From (45), Q̂ = kq̂ and Γ = k(X −Ψ) + P ′ − C ′ we obtain
q̂ =
1
Γ + kX
, Q̂ =
k
Γ + kX
. (47)
Using (46) to replace ∆q̂ in (44), solving for ∆Q̂ and inserting back into ∆q̂ gives
∆Q̂ =
π̃ − q(P ′ − C ′)
π̃Ψ− qC ′(P ′ − C ′)
, ∆q̂ = − q
2C ′′
π̃Ψ− qC ′(P ′ − C ′)
. (48)
In order to complete the proof of (13)–(18), note that we can write
q̂i =
q̂ −∆q̂
2
, Q̂i =
Q̂−∆Q̂
2
, k̂i =
Q̂i − kq̂i
q
. (49)
Inserting (47) and (48) into (49) and into q̂j = q̂ − q̂i, Q̂j = Q̂ − Q̂i as well as k̂j = −k̂i
and rearranging the resulting expressions, it is straightforward to prove (13)–(18).
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Proof of (19) and (20). Equation (20) follows from comparing (10) with (18). To
prove (∂Qj/∂τi)|en > (∂Qj/∂τi)|ex in (19), use (9), (17), Ω = (Γ + kX )(Γ − kX ) and
Ω̃ = 2(Γ + kX )[π̃Ψ− qC ′(P ′ −C ′)], multiply both sides of the inequality by Γ + kX < 0,
Γ− kX = P ′ − C ′ − kΨ < 0 and π̃Ψ− qC ′(P ′ − C ′) > 0 and rearrange. We obtain
π̃
[
(Γ− kX )(Γ + kX + kΨ) + 2k2XΨ
]
− q(P ′ − C ′)
[
(Γ− kX )(Γ + kX + kC ′) + 2k2XC ′
]
> 0. (50)
Taking into account the definitions of Γ and Ψ, the terms in brackets can be rewritten as
(Γ−kX )(Γ+kX+kΨ)+2k2XΨ = (P ′−C ′)(Γ+kX ) and (Γ−kX )(Γ+kX+kC ′)+2k2XC ′ =
(P ′ − C ′ − qkC ′′)(Γ + kX). Inserting into (50) yields
(Γ + kX )(P ′ − C ′)
[
π̃ − q(P ′ − C ′ − qkC ′′)
]
> 0. (51)
Due to Γ < 0, X < 0, P ′ < 0, C ′ > 0, π̃ > 0 and C ′′ ≥ 0, this condition is satisfied, proving
(∂Qj/∂τi)|en > (∂Qj/∂τi)|ex. From (20) it finally follows (∂Qi/∂τi)|en < (∂Qi/∂τi)|ex.
Proof of Proposition 1. Define
H(Q) := Z ′(Q)− c− δF ′(1−Q), (52)
M(Q;ϕ, η) := ϕ(1 + η)D′
[
(1 + η)Q
]
, (53)
Mex(Q;ϕ, η) := ϕD′
[
(1 + η)Q
](
1 + η
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
)
. (54)
H(Q) is a decreasing function in Q due to H ′(Q) = Z ′′(Q) + δF ′′(1 − Q) < 0, and
M(Q;ϕ, η) is non-decreasing in Q since MQ(Q,ϕ, η) = ϕ(1 + η)
2D′′
[
(1 + η)Q
]
≥ 0. With
the help of (52)–(54), (25) and (27) can be rewritten as, respectively,
H(Q∗) = M(Q∗;ϕ, η), H(Qex) = Mex(Qex;ϕ, η). (55)
If ϕ = 0 or η = 0, (53)–(55) imply M(Q;ϕ, η) = Mex(Q;ϕ, η) for all Q and, thus,
Qex = Q∗, as stated in Proposition 1i. If ϕ > 0 and η > 0, thenM(Q;ϕ, η) > Mex(Q;ϕ, η)
for all Q due to (∂Qi/∂τi)|ex < 0 and (∂Qj/∂τi)|ex > 0 from (9). Since H is decreasing
and M non-decreasing in Q, it follows that the intersection between H and Mex is to the
right of the intersection between H and M , i.e. Qex > Q∗ as stated in Proposition 1ii.
25
In a symmetric situation with τi = τj =: τ and Qi = Qj =: Q, we can rewrite (8) as
τ = P (2Q) +QP ′(2Q)/k − C(Q)−QC ′(Q)/k =: G(Q). (56)
Differentiating yields G′(Q) = (2 + 1/k)P ′ + 2QP ′′/k − (1 + 1/k)C ′ −QC ′′/k < 0 due to
P ′ < 0, C ′ > 0, C ′′ ≥ 0 and P ′ +QP ′′/k < 0. Hence, G is a decreasing function in Q. In
case of ϕ = 0 or η = 0, we have Q∗ = Qex and thereby τ ∗ = τ ex, whereas for ϕ > 0 and
η > 0, Qex > Q∗ implies τ ex < τ ∗. This completes the proof or Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Analogous to Mex(Q,ϕ, η) let
Men(Q;ϕ, η) := ϕD′
[
(1 + η)Q
](
1 + η
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
)
. (57)
The condition for the Nash equilibrium with endogenous location decision then reads
H(Qen) = Men(Qen;ϕ, η). (58)
Obviously, Men(Q;ϕ, η) = Mex(Q;ϕ, η) = M(Q;ϕ, η) for all Q if ϕ = 0 or η = 0. We
then obtain Proposition 2i by the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1i.
In order to proof Proposition 2ii we show that Men(Q,ϕ, η) < Mex(Q,ϕ, η) for all Q
since then the intersection of Men(Q,ϕ, η) with H(Q) is to the right of the intersection of
Mex(Q,ϕ, η) with H(Q) and, thus, Qen > Qex and τ en < τ ex due to (56) and G′(Q) < 0.
Using (54) and (57), we obtain Men(Q,ϕ, η) < Mex(Q,ϕ, η) if and only if
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
<
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
ex
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
en
, (59)
where all derivatives are evaluated at the same Q. Inserting (9), (16) and (17), multiplying
with ΩΩ̃/k < 0, collecting common terms and dividing by Γ + kX < 0 gives
π̃(Γ− kX + kΨ)− q(P ′ − C ′)(Γ− kX + kC ′) < 0. (60)
Inserting Γ = k(X −Ψ) + P ′−C ′ and dividing by P ′−C ′ < 0, condition (60) reduces to
π̃ − q(P ′ − C ′ − kqC ′′) > 0. (61)
Condition (61) is satisfied due to π̃ > 0, P ′ < 0, C ′ > 0 and C ′′ ≥ 0.
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Online Appendix
Second-order condition, reaction functions and stability in the Y -sector. The
first-order condition (8) of profit maximization of firm ` in country i can be written as
dπi`
dqi`
= P (Qi,−` + qi` +Qj) + qi`P
′(Qi,−` + qi` +Qj)
− C(Qi,−` + qi`)− qi`C ′(Qi,−` + qi`)− τi = 0. (62)
This equation determines the reaction function of firm ` in country i. The slope with
respect to output of the firm’s competitors from country i and j read, respectively,
∂qi`
∂Qi,−`
= − P
′ + qi`P
′′ − C ′ − qi`C ′′
2P ′ + qi`P ′′ − 2C ′ − qi`C ′′
, (63)
∂qi`
∂Qj
= − P
′ + qi`P
′′
2P ′ + qi`P ′′ − 2C ′ − qi`C ′′
. (64)
Our assumption P ′ + qi`P
′′ < 0 together with P ′ < 0, C ′ > 0 and C ′′ > 0 ensures
a negative sign of the common denominator of (63) and (64), which equals the second
derivative of the firm’s profit function, d2πi`/dq
2
i`. Hence, the second-order condition for
profit maximization is satisfied. Moreover, since P ′+qi`P
′′ < 0 also renders the numerators
of (63) and (64) negative, the reaction function is decreasing in Qi,−` and Qj, reflecting the
case of strategic substitutes. Finally, the condition P ′ + qi`P
′′ < 0 ensures that (63) and
(64) are larger than −1, implying stability of the Nash equilibrium. All these properties
are not guaranteed if, in contrast to our assumption, we suppose P ′ + qi`P
′′ ≥ 0.
Autarky versus free trade. With the demand function P̃ (Qi) and the wage rate given
by (6), firm `’s profit in sector Y of country i under autarky can be written as
πi` =
[
P̃ (Qi,−` + qi`)− C(Qi,−` + qi`)− τi
]
qi`. (65)
The first-order condition of profit maximization, evaluated at a symmetric solution, is
P̃ (kqi) + qiP̃
′(kqi)− C(kqi)− qiC ′(kqi)− τi = 0. (66)
Applying the implicit function theorem and defining Γ̃ := k(P̃ ′+qP̃ ′′−Ψ)+P̃ ′−C ′ < 0, we
immediately obtain (∂qi/∂τi)|aut = 1/Γ̃ < 0, (∂Qi/∂τi)|aut = k/Γ̃ < 0 and (∂qj/∂τi)|aut =
(∂Qj/∂τi)|aut = 0. Welfare in country i is again given by (22). As under free trade, we
31
have wi = C(Qi), Π
x
i = δF (1 − Qi) + [c − C(Qi)](1 − Qi) and Ti = τiQi. But profit in
sector Y and the household’s expenditures for good Y have to be replaced by, respectively,
Πyi = [P̃ (Qi)− C(Qi)− τi]Qi and pyi = QiP̃ (Qi). Inserting into (22) gives (33).
To compare non-cooperation under autarky and free trade, note that the equilibrium
condition (34) under autarky can be rewritten as
H(Qaut) = ϕD′
[
(1 + η)Qaut
]
. (67)
The equilibrium condition under free trade is given by (27) or, equivalently, H(Qex) =
Mex(Qex, ϕ, η) in (55). Due to (54), it is obvious that Mex(Q;ϕ, η) < ϕD′[(1 + η)Q] for
all Q. Since H ′ < 0, it immediately follows that Qaut < Qex and, by (56), τaut > τ ex.
Endogenous versus exogenous wage rate. If Z(·) and F (·) are both quadratic, then
P (·) = Z ′(·) and C(·) = c + δF ′(·) are both linear. Hence, P ′(·) = Z ′′(·) and C ′(·) =
−δF ′′(·) are both constant and we obtain P ′′(·) = C ′′(·) = 0. Using this specification
together with the definition of X , condition (25) of the efficient solution and condition
(27) of the Nash policy equilibrium can be rewritten as, respectively,
H̃(Q∗, δ) = ϕ(1 + η)D′[(1 + η)Q∗], (68)
H̃(Qex, δ) = ϕD′
[
(1 + η)Qex
](
1− η kZ
′′
(k + 1)(Z ′′ + δF ′′)
)
, (69)
where
H̃(Q, δ) := Z ′(Q)− c− δF ′(1−Q). (70)
Note that H̃Q(Q, δ) = Z
′′(Q) + δF ′′(1 − Q) < 0. Moreover, H̃(Q, δ) < H̃(Q, 0) and
H̃Q(Q, δ) < H̃Q(Q, 0) for all Q and δ > 0, due to F
′ > 0 and F ′′ < 0. Hence, the function
H̃ is decreasing in Q, and moving from an exogenous wage rate (δ = 0) to an endogenous
wage rate (δ > 0) moves H̃ downwards and makes it steeper.
Next denote the difference between the RHS of (68) and the RHS of (69), both
evaluated at the same Q, as R(Q, δ). Rearranging yields
R(Q, δ) = ηϕD′[(1 + η)Q]
(2k + 1)Z ′′ + (k + 1)δF ′′
(k + 1)(Z ′′ + δF ′′)
. (71)
Differentiating yields
RQ(Q, δ) = η(1 + η)ϕD
′′[(1 + η)Q]
(2k + 1)Z ′′ + (k + 1)δF ′′
(k + 1)(Z ′′ + δF ′′)
> 0, (72)
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Rδ(Q, δ) = −ηϕD′[(1 + η)Q]
k(k + 1)Z ′′F ′′
(k + 1)2(Z ′′ + δF ′′)2
< 0. (73)
Hence, for given δ, the gap between the RHS of (68) and the RHS of (69) is increasing in
Q, as shown by (72). And for any given Q, moving from an exogenous wage rate (δ = 0)
to an endogenous wage rate (δ > 0) reduces the gap between the RHS of (68) and the
RHS of (69), as shown by (73). Combining these insights with the properties of H̃ implies
that Qex −Q∗ is smaller for an endogenous wage rate than for an exogenous wage rate.
Model with third country. In order to compare the non-cooperative equilibrium with
the policy under full cooperation, rewrite (38) and (40) as
Ĥ(Q∗) = 0, (74)
Ĥ(Q̂ex) = −Q̂exZ ′′(2Q̂ex)
(
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
+
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
)/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
. (75)
with Ĥ(Q) := Z ′(2Q)−c−δF ′(1−Q) and Ĥ ′(Q) := 2Z ′′(2Q)+δF ′′(1−Q) < 0, so Ĥ(Q) is
decreasing in Q. Since Z ′′(·) < 0, (∂Qi/∂τi)|êx < 0 and [∂(Qi +Qj)/∂τi]|êx < 0, the RHS
of (75) is positive and in comparison with (74) implies Q̂ex < Q̂∗. Using the first-order
condition of profit maximization gives τ = P̂ (2Q) + QP̂ ′(2Q)/k − C(Q) − QC ′(Q)/k =:
Ĝ(Q) with Ĝ′(Q) = (2 + 1/k)P̂ ′ + 2QP̂ ′′/k − (1 + 1/k)C ′ −QC ′′/k < 0. From Q̂ex < Q̂∗
it then follows τ̂ ex > τ̂ ∗. In order to compare the Nash policy equilibrium with the policy
chosen under partial cooperation, rewrite condition (39) under partial cooperation as
Ĥ(Q̂∗∗) = −2Q̂∗∗Z ′′(2Q̂∗∗). (76)
Due to Z ′′(·) < 0, [∂(Qi + Qj)/∂τi]|êx < 0, (∂Qi/∂τi)|êx < 0 and (∂Qj/∂τi)|êx > 0, the
RHS of (76) is larger than the RHS of (75), implying Q̂ex > Q̂∗∗ and τ̂ ex < τ̂ ∗∗.
The import externality can be computed from (36) as
IE :=
∂V̂ C(Qi, Qj)
∂τi
= −2Q̂exZ ′′(2Q̂ex)
(
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
+
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
)
< 0. (77)
Differentiating V̂ (Qj, Qi) defined analogous to (37), the export externality reads
EE :=
∂V̂ (Qj, Qi)
∂τi
=
[
Z ′(2Q̂ex)− c− δF ′(1− Q̂ex)
] ∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
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+ Q̂exZ ′′(2Q̂ex)
(
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
+
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
)
.(78)
Using (40) in order to replace Z ′ − c− δF ′ and rearranging, we obtain
EE = Q̂exZ ′′(2Q̂ex)
(
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
+
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
)(
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
− ∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
)/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
> 0. (79)
In order to compare the non-cooperative case with full cooperation, we have to add IE
and EE. After some rearrangements, we obtain
IE + EE = −Q̂exZ ′′(2Q̂ex)
(
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
+
∂Qj
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
)2/
∂Qi
∂τi
∣∣∣∣
êx
< 0, (80)
and, thus, inefficient overtaxation. In comparison with partial cooperation, only the
positive export externality EE matters. We then obtain inefficient undertaxation.
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